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Abstract
Peer-to-peer lending platforms are increasingly important alternatives to
traditional forms of credit intermediation for small value loans. There are
high hopes that they improve financial inclusion and provide better terms for
borrowers. To study these hopes, we introduce altruistic investors into a peer-
to-peer model of credit intermediation. We find that altruistic investors do
not improve financial inclusion but that the borrowing rates are lower than
the ones obtained with self-interested investors. Furthermore, investors with
strong altruistic preferences are willing to finance projects which generate an
expected loss to them. For a certain range of parameters, the model’s allocation
is observationally equivalent to a model with self-interested investors with low
bargaining power. Outside of this range, the model generates allocations that
are not incentive feasible in a model with self-interested investors.
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1 Introduction
Borrowing peer-to-peer from friends and family is still highly relevant today. Accord-
ing to a report by the World Bank “globally in 2017, 47 percent of adults reported
having borrowed money in the past 12 months [and] that borrowers in developing
economies are most likely to turn to family or friends (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., p. 9
and p. 67).”1
More recently, crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending platforms have enabled
loans between lenders and borrowers that don’t know each other personally. These
online platforms match lenders with borrowers and have established themselves as
alternatives to traditional forms of credit intermediation for small value loans. For
example, Kiva operates in 78 countries and has 3.3 million borrowers and 1.8 million
lenders (see kiva.org). The total volumes of loans intermediated is 1.32 billion USD.2
Increasingly, microfinance institutions are using these platforms to promote fi-
nancial inclusion. According to McIntosh (2012), they “lend to loss-making market
segments that would be unserved in a purely profit-driven market, and these financial
losses are justified by the social impact of the activity. The sources of funding for
microfinance [...] typically have at least partially humanitarian objectives (p.11).”3
There are high hopes that these platforms improve financial inclusion by providing
funds to microentrepreneurs that have no access to the traditional financial sector
and that the interest rates on these loans are below market rates. To study these
hopes, we introduce altruistic investors and microentrepreneurs into a peer-to-peer
model of credit intermediation. In order to determine the terms of the contract we
focus on Pareto efficient pricing mechanisms.
Our key findings for any Pareto efficient pricing mechanism are the following:
First, altruistic investors do not promote financial inclusion because all projects that
are financed by altruistic investors would also be financed by self-interested investors.
Second, altruistic investors offer better terms to borrowers than self-interested in-
vestors.4 Third, investors with strong altruistic preferences are willing to finance
1Historically, peer-to-peer lending among family and friends has been the norm and precedes
the develpoment of financial instituions.
2Other peer-to-peer lending platforms are Companisto, FundedByMe and Fundingcircle.
Zopa.com was the first peer-to-peer lending website world wide.
3According to McIntosh (2012), “an estimated 5 billion US dollars has flowed from the developed
world to microfinance lenders over the past decade (p.11).”
4Riedl and Smeets (2017) report experimental evidence that socially motivated investors are
willing to forgo financial performance. Freedman and Jin (2017) analyze transaction level data
from prosper.com which is the largest peer-to-peer consumer lending platform in the US. They find
that “lenders are more likely to fund and provide lower interest rates to loans with social networking
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projects which generate an expected financial loss to them.
We also explore the terms of the loans obtained from the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. Here we find that for a certain range of the parameter that
represents altruism, the model’s allocation is observationally equivalent to a model
with self-interested investors with low bargaining power. In this range, the model
can replicate any allocation that can be achieved in a bargaining model with self-
interested investors. Outside of this range, the model generates allocations that are
not incentive feasible in a model with self-interested agents.
There is little known about the terms of the loans that are negotiated between
friends and family because of the informality of these borrowing arrangements. How-
ever, the basic characteristics of such borrowing is that the lender and the borrower
know each other well, and it is likely that the lender is motivated by objectives aside
from profit maximization. Rather, lenders might positively value the well-being of
the borrowers and for this reason it is likely that our key results apply in these
situations.
Peer-to-peer lending platforms may attract projects that appeal to socially moti-
vated investors (McIntosh, 2012). However, there is an important difference between
lending among friends and family and lending through online platforms because peer-
to-peer online platforms suffer from severe private information problems. For this
reason, Freedman and Jin (2017) provide two distinct interpretations for their finding
that lenders provide lower interest rates to loans with social networking attributes:
either lenders miscalculate the expected returns because of private information prob-
lems or they are motivated by objectives aside from profit maximization such as
altruistic preferences. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, they
consider how lenders change their lending behavior in response to missing payments
in their loan portfolio. They find that “charity is not the only motivation for funding
social loans and lenders attempt to increase their profits in response to discovering
poor outcomes for these types of loans (p. 212).”5
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and presents the results. Section 3 discusses extensions and Section 4 concludes.
attributes, despite many of these loans being less likely to repay on time (p. 210).”
5In an earlier paper, Freedman and Jin (2010) also find that the funding of low return loans is
due to “mistakes” rather than a form of “charity.”
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2 Model
The economy is populated with a large number of identical microentrepreneurs or
borrowers and a large number of identical investors. There are two periods t = 0, 1.
Each borrower is endowed with a project in t = 0 that yields output y in t = 1.6
In order to carry out their projects, each borrower needs to borrow one unit of an
indivisible capital good. We abstract from limited commitment and private informa-
tion issues and assume that borrowers repay their loans with certainty. Denote xI
the quantity obtained by the investor and xB the quantity retained by the borrower
with y = xI + xB.
In what follows we consider a match between a representative investor and a
representative borrower. The borrower’s surplus is
SB = xB − u, (1)
where u is an effort cost for implementing the project.7 The term xB = y− xI is the
net return of the project for the borrower since y is the return and xI is the payment
to the investor. The borrower’s participation constraint is
SB ≥ 0. (2)
Each investor is endowed with one unit of labor that can be used to produce
an indivisible unit of a capital good at disutility ρ in period t = 0.8 Accordingly,
define the profit of the investor from producing and investing the capital good in a
borrower’s project as
pi ≡ xI − ρ. (3)
The investors are risk neutral with altruistic preferences. The representative in-
vestor’s surplus is
SI = pi + aSB. (4)
The investor’s surplus depends on the profit of the investment pi plus the altruistic
term aSb. The altruistic parameter a measures how strongly the investor cares about
6An alternative assumption is that the gross returns of the projects are random and stochastically
independent. In an earlier version of the paper we derived the model under this assumption and
found equivalent results.
7In the extension section we explore the implications of the interpretation that the term u
represents the utility the borrower gets when he implements the project by himself.
8An alternative interpretation is that the investor is endowed with the capital good and has
an alternative riskless investment opportunity that yields ρ. The implications of this alternative
interpretation are investigated in the extension section.
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the borrower’s surplus. This simple form of representing altruistic preferences is
based on Levine (1998).
We impose the following condition on a:
0 ≤ a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1. (5)
Throughout the paper we call an investor with a > 0 an altruistic investor and we call
an investor with a = 0 a self-interested investor. Furthermore, we call an investor,
who is willing to make a loss, an investor with strong altruistic preference. Finally,
for a > ρ(y − u)−1 the investor is willing to offer the capital good for free and to
provide additional ressources to the borrower. Condition (5) rules this case out, but
in reality we might observe such behavior between close relatives such as parents
who are willing to help their children to found a start-up project.
The investor’s participation constraint is
SI ≥ 0. (6)
In a standard model of financial intermediation (for a = 0), it is easy to show
that it is socially optimal to carry out all projects with an return y that covers the
cost of the borrower u plus the cost of the investor ρ. That is,
S ≡ y − ρ− u ≥ 0. (7)
One of the issues we discuss throughout the paper is whether inequality (7)
continues to hold with altruistic investors. In particular, would an altruistic investor
be willing to finance a project with S < 0? This question relates to financial inclusion.
If altruistic investors also finance projects with S < 0, then more microentrepreneurs
have access to credit which promotes financial inclusion. We will come back to this
question throughout the paper.
Using (3) and (7) we can rewrite the surpluses as follows:
SB = S − pi and SI = aS + (1− a)pi. (8)
For both participation constraints to hold, the investor’s profit must lie in the interval
S ≥ pi ≥
−aS
1− a
. (9)
In a standard model of financial intermediation (for a = 0), the interval reduces to
S ≥ pi ≥ 0. The investor is willing to provide the capital good if and only if his profit
is nonnegative.
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Figure 1: Pareto frontiers for α = 0 and some α > 0.
2.1 Pareto frontier
We begin with a description of the Pareto frontier. The Pareto frontier can be derived
from (8) as follows:9
SI = S − (1− a)SB. (10)
The investor’s profit pi does not affect the shape of the Pareto frontier since (10) is
independent of pi. However, it affects the individual surpluses (8). Figure 1 plots the
Pareto frontier for a = 0 and some a > 0. The black line is the Pareto frontier for
a = 0 and the blue line is the Pareto frontier for some a > 0. Any efficient pricing
protocol selects surplus pairs on these frontiers.
Proposition 1 (Pareto frontier) Consider any efficient pricing mechanism that
selects a surplus pair (SB, SI) on the Pareto frontier. Then, the following is true for
a > 0: (i) Iff SB < S, pi > 0. (ii) Iff SB = S, pi = 0. (ii) Iff SB > S, pi < 0.
The main result of Proposition 1 is that any pricing model that selects a point
S
1−a
≥ SB > S will yield a negative profit for the investor. The proof follows straight-
forward from SB = S − pi (see (8)). The investor is willing to accept a financial loss
9A formal definition of the Pareto frontier is in the Appendix.
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as long as SI = aS + (1− a)pi remains positive. Note that the results in Proposition
1 require altruistic preferences since for a = 0, the investor’s participation constraint
does not allow for a negative profit; that is, SI = pi ≥ 0. Figure 1 also shows how a
change of a affects the Pareto frontier. An increase in a tilts the Pareto frontier up
and to the right.
One pricing mechanism that yields negative profits for investors is Bertrand price
competition. Assume a model with many altruistic investors and few borrowers,
where investors compete for financing projects. In such a market, the investors
obtain no surplus, that is SI = aS + (1 − a)pi = 0 implying that pi = −
aS
1−a
< 0.
Thus, with Bertrand competition and altruistic preferences investors are willing to
accept a financial loss.
2.2 Feasibility
We have not yet determined whether all surplus pairs (SI , SB) on the Pareto frontier
are feasible. Feasibility requires that every surplus pair respects 0 ≤ xI ≤ y.
Proposition 2 (Feasibility) If a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1, then every Pareto-efficient alloca-
tion is feasible.
According to Proposition 2, feasibility requires that the altruistic parameter a is
not too large.10 Under this condition any surplus pair (SB, SI) on the Pareto frontier
is feasible. The condition a ≤ ρ(y− u)−1 implies that xI ≥ 0 for any surplus pair on
the Pareto frontier.
To get some intuition for this condition, consider the surplus pair (SI = 0, SB =
S
1−a
). For this element on the Pareto frontier we obtain pi = − aS
1−a
and the following
quantities:
xI = ρ−
aS
1− a
and xB = y − ρ+
aS
1− a
.
The investor makes a loss since pi = xI − ρ = −
aS
1−a
< 0. However, the condition
a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1 implies that xI remains positive.
Next, consider the surplus pair (SI = aS, SB = S). For this element on the
Pareto frontier we obtain pi = 0, and the following quantities:
xI = ρ and xB = y − ρ.
For this surplus pair, there is no condition on a since xI is positive for all possible
values of a. Thus, the condition a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1 makes sure that the quantity xI is
10The proof for Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Note that ρ(y − u)−1 < 1.
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positive for any possible surplus pair on the Pareto frontier. For most elements on
the Pareto frontier, it is a sufficient condition, but not necessary.
The allocation xI = 0 and xB = y is a donation since the capital good is provided
for free. It yields the surpluses
SI = −ρ+ a(y − u) and SB = y − u.
Individual rationality requires that SI ≥ 0. That is, a ≥ ρ(y − u)
−1. Then, our
feasibility constraint a ≤ ρ(y−u)−1 implies that a donation is feasible and individual
rational if a = ρ(y − u)−1.
The condition a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1 rules out that xI < 0 in the model. In practice,
however, in particular when considering borrowing peer-to-peer among friends and
family, one can imagine that an investor with deep pockets and very strong altru-
istic preference offers the capital good for free and makes an additional financial
contribution to the borrower; i.e. xI < 0. A donation of the capital good plus an
additional contribution is individual rational for the investor for large a. To provide
an example, assume a = 1 and the allocation xI = −u and xB = y+u. For this case
the surpluses are
SI = −u− ρ+ y = S ≥ 0 and SB = y.
2.3 Nash bargaining solution
In what follows we study the Nash bargaining solution that also selects surplus
pairs on the Pareto frontier. It is frequently used to model bilateral bargaining (see
Binmore et al., 1986). In the context of our model, the investor and the borrower
negotiate about the interest rate r = pi/ρ (or equivalently the investor’s profit) that
the borrower has to pay for the loan. The parameter 1 ≥ θ ≥ 0 is the bargaining
power of the investor. The Nash bargaining solution satisfies
piN = argmax
pi
(SI)
θ(SB)
1−θ (11)
and the first-order condition is
SB
SI
=
(1− θ)
θ(1− a)
. (12)
Use (8) to rewrite (12) as follows:11
S − piN
aS + (1− a)piN
=
(1− θ)
θ(1− a)
. (13)
11The second derivative with respect to pi is negative if S > 0. Accordingly, the first-order
condition (12) describes a maximum.
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Solving equation (13) for piN yields
piN = θ˜S, (14)
where θ˜ ≡ (θ− a)/(1− a). Recall that the interest rate satisfies rN = piN/ρ. Hence,
the investor’s profit and the interest rate are increasing in θ and decreasing in a. If
the borrower has all the bargaining power (θ = 0), then the investor’s profit equals
the one that is obtained under Bertrand price competition (namely, pi = − aS
1−a
). If
the investor is self-interested (a = 0), they make a positive profit since piN = θS ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 (Interest rate and profits) Properties of the bargaining solution:
(i) piN is decreasing in a. (ii) For a > θ, piN < 0. (iii) For θ = a, piN = 0. (iv) For
θ > a, piN > 0.
Proposition 3 summarizes the key properties of the Nash bargaining solution.
According to (i), altruistic investor preferences lower the borrowing costs since piN
and rN are decreasing in a. This is consistent with experimental evidence reported
in Riedl and Smeets (2017) and Freedman and Jin (2017). According to (ii) for a
sufficiently large a, the investor is willing to provide financing even though he makes
a loss. Finally, according to (iv), if a is sufficiently small, the investor makes a profit.
From (14), ∂piN/∂S = θ˜. This has some interesting implications. For example, if
θ < a, then an increase in y reduces the investor’s profit. Furthermore, it implies that
the interest rate can be decreasing (θ < a) or increasing (θ > a) in y. In contrast,
with self-interested investors (a = 0), the interest rate is always increasing in y.
Proposition 4 (Equivalence result) For θ ≥ a the model is observational equiv-
alent to a model with self-interested investors (a = 0) that have bargaining power
θ˜ < θ.
According to Proposition 4 if θ ≥ a, the model is observational equivalent to a
model where the investor has no altruistic preferences (a = 0) and bargaining power
θ˜ since the two models deliver the same interest rates and the same nonnegative
profits. Furthermore, from (8), the borrower surplus is the same in both models.
This result allows as to show graphically the equivalence result in Figure 2. For
θ < a, this replication is not possible because the investor makes a financial loss
which is not incentive feasible in a model without altruistic preferences.
2.4 Financial inclusion
In the following we discuss how altruistic investors affect financial inclusion. Recall
from (7) that in standard model with self-interested investors all projects are financed
9
Figure 2: Equivalence result.
that satisfy S ≥ 0. Improving financial inclusion would require that investors are
willing to finance additional projects; i.e., projects with S < 0. This is a priori
not impossible because as previously shown altruistic investors are willing to finance
projects that are not profitable to them.
Proposition 5 (Financial inclusion) Consider any efficient pricing mechanism.
Then, altruistic investors do not improve financial inclusion.
According to Proposition 5, altruistic investors do not improve financial inclusion
for any efficient pricing mechanism. To see this, rewrite (10) as follows:
S = SI + (1− a)SB. (15)
Financing a project with S < 0 would require that either SI < 0, SB < 0, or both.
However, any of these cases would be inconsistent with individual rationality. Thus,
with altruistic preference only projects with S ≥ 0 are financed. The same projects
also receive funding in a model with self-interested investors (a = 0). This clearly
shows that altruistic preferences do not affect the type of projects that are financed.
They have, however, important distributional consequences which we discuss further
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below.12
2.5 Distributional effects
We now study how the individual surpluses react to various parameter changes for
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In order to derive closed form solutions
for the individual surpluses, use (14) to rewrite (8) as follows:
SB =
1− θ
1− a
S and SI = θS. (16)
Interestingly, the altruistic preference parameter a has no effect on the investor’s
surplus. It only affects the borrower’s surplus positively. SI = θS implies that all
benefits of an increase of the altruistic preference parameter a accrue to the borrower.
A constant SI is only possible if an increase in a decreases the investor’s profit by
the amount that holds the investor’s surplus constant.
3 Extensions
In this section we first explore in more depth the relation of our model to the Nash
bargaining solution. We then introduce non-zero threats points and discuss the
effects of joint liability.
3.1 Nash bargaining
A few shortcuts have been taken when deriving the model and the results. Here we
connect our analysis more closely to the Nash bargaining model (Nash, 1953). As
described in Binmore et al. (1986) “in a two-person bargaining situation, there is a
set X of possible agreements, where x ∈ X specifies the physical consequences to the
two parties if x is agreed upon by both.” In the context of our model, the possible
agreements are how to divide the output of the project y. Accordingly, the set of
possible agreements is
X ≡ {(xI , xB) ≥ (0, 0) : xB + xI ≤ y} ,
12In an earlier version of the paper the gross returns of the project were random and stochastically
independent. We also found that altruistic preferences do not affect the type of projects that are
financed. This confirms the finding of Freedman and Jin (2017), which emphasize that loans to
borrowers who miss payments is a mistake which supports the argument that altruism does not
intentionally expand access.
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where we assume that is not possible to allocate negative amounts. This implicitly
requires that the altruistic preference parameter is not too large, see condition (5).
Furthermore, according to Binmore et al. (1986) Nash describes the “bargaining
problem by using only the information contained in a pair of utility functions u1, u2,
which represent the parties’ preferences over X, and a pair of utility levels that are
referred to variously as the status quo, the disagreement point, or the threat point.”
In the context of our application, the bargaining problem is represented by the pair
(d, U) where
U ≡ {(uI (xI) , uB (xB)) : (xI , xB) ∈ X}
is the bargaining set and d ∈ U is the disagreement point.
The symmetric Nash bargaining solution is the unique element in U that maxi-
mizes the Nash product13
(
xN
I
, xN
B
)
= argmax(uI (xI)− dI)(uB (xB)− dB).
The unique pair
(
xN
I
, xN
B
)
that maximizes the Nash product is called the sym-
metric Nash bargaining solution. The generalized Nash bargaining solution removes
the symmetry axiom (Roth, 1979) from the axiomatization of the Nash bargaining
solution. It solves
(
xN
I
, xN
B
)
= argmax(uI (xI)− dI)
θ(uB (xB)− dB)
1−θ,
where θ introduces different weights to the players. Binmore et al. (1986) show that
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution can be approximated by assuming that
the players have different time intervals for making counter offers in the strategic
alternating offer bargaining game.
Our main departure from the standard use of the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution is that we assume that the investor’s utility depends not only on the absolute
gains that he may achieve, but also on the gain achieved by the borrower. That is,
we solve (
xN
I
, xN
B
)
= argmax(uI (xI , xB)− dI)
θ(uB (xB)− dB)
1−θ.
Furthermore, we assume that the threat points are (dI , dB) = (0, 0) and that the
utilities satisfy
(uI (xI , xB) , uB (xB)) = (xI − ρ+ a (xB − u) , xB − u) .
Finally, recall our definitions S ≡ y−u−ρ and pi ≡ xI−ρ. This allows us to rewrite
the utilities (surpluses) as in equation (8).
13Nash (1953) demonstrated that this is the unique bargaining solution satisfying the axioms of
scale invariance, symmetry, efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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3.2 Positive threat points
Binmore et al. (1986) show that the Nash bargaining solution can be attained from
an explicit strategic bargaining model of the sort developed by Rubinstein (1982)
when the time between offers and counteroffers vanishes, where U and d depend on
details of the strategic environment. The specification of the disagreement point d
in the bargaining depends on whether there is a risk of an exogenous breakdown
in Rubinstein’s alternating offer bargaining game. One example for an exogenous
breakdown is when individuals continue to meet other potential trading partners
between bargaining rounds and might switch partners as in Berentsen et al. (2002).
In this case, there is a chance that the bargaining partner meets an other player
and leaves the bargaining table and the abandoned player consumes his threat point.
If there is no risk of an exogenous termination, then d = (0, 0). This is what we
assumed in (11).
If there is an exogenous probability that the negotiation is terminated, then the
threat point d should reflect what the players get if such a breakdown occurs (see
Binmore et al. (1986)). To explore this possibility, we assume that d = (dI , dB) ∈
U . For example, assume that the borrower gets utility dB from implementing the
project himself. Assume further that the investor gets utility dI from investing in an
alternative project.
With these assumptions the surpluses satisfy SB = S − pi − dB and SI = aS +
(1− a)pi − dI , and the solution to the bargaining problem pi
N yields
piN = θ˜S − θdB +
(1− θ)
1− a
dI , (17)
which is consistent with the well known result that an increase of a player’s threat
point benefits that player. Note that ∂pi
N
∂a
= − 1−θ
(1−a)2
(S − d1). Thus, the disagreement
point dI dampens the negative effect that an increase of the altruistic parameter a
has on the investor.
3.3 A negative threat point for the investor
In the main part of the paper we have assumed that the threat points are (dI , dB) =
(0, 0) and that the utilities satisfy
(uI (xI , xB) , uB (xB)) = (xI − ρ+ a (xB − u) , xB − u) .
It is easy to show that the following alternative assumptions yield exactly the same
results, namely (dI , dB) = (−a (xB − u) , 0) and that the utilities satisfy
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(uI (xI) , uB (xB)) = (xI − ρ, xB − u) .
There are two changes. First, the investor has no altruistic preferences. Second,
he has a negative threat point. The Nash bargaining solution requires that (dI , dB) ∈
U . This is not the case here but we could change X to allow for negative quantities xI
for the investor. This change would imply that the investor has some extra resources
available that he can add to the bargianing table.
What is the interpretation of a negative threat point? The investor’s threat point
is the utility he obtains if the negotiation breaks down because the borrower finds
another bargaining partner. With dI = −a (xB − u), his threat point depends on the
utility that the borrower will get from the ne partner multiplies by the parameter
a. We conclude our discussion here and leave the interpretation of a negative threat
point to future research.
3.4 Joint liability
In an extension of the model Berentsen and Markheim (2019) introduce joint liability
contracts and stochastic returns of the projects by assuming that one investor is
matched with two borrowers.14 If one borrower cannot repay the loan, then the other
borrower if successful will have to pay c, with 0 ≤ c ≤ xI , to partially compensate
the investor for the failure of one of the projects. We find that the joint liability
parameter c does not improve financial inclusion.
4 Summary
We introduce altruistic investors and microentrepreneurs who need funding into a
peer-to-peer model of credit intermediation. In order to determine the terms of the
loans we consider efficient pricing mechanisms. The model sheds light on how new
technologies such as peer-to-peer lending platforms with altruistic investors affects
borrowing conditions, financial inclusion and the surpluses of investors and borrowers.
The altruistic preference of the investor is captured by the altruistic parameter
a where a higher a means that the investor cares more about the well-being of the
borrower. We find the following: First, for any efficient pricing mechanism altruistic
investors do not promote financial inclusion. Second, altruistic investors offer better
terms to borrowers since an increase in a reduces the interest rate. Third, an investor
14Armendariz (2010) and Markheim (2018) provide an overview into the modeling of debt con-
tracts with joint liability in the context of microfinance.
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with strong altruistic preferences is willing to finance a project that generates a loss
to him.
Using the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to determine the interest rate we
find that for a certain range of the parameter a, the model’s allocation is observation-
ally equivalent to a model without altruistic preferences and low investor bargaining
power. In this range, the model can replicate any allocation that the bargaining
model without altruistic investors is able to attain. For some different range of a,
however, the bargaining model generates allocations that are not incentive feasible
in the same bargaining model without altruistic investors.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 Define the set of Pareto efficient surplus pairs as follows:
P ≡ {(SI , SB) ≥ (0, 0) : SI = S − (1− a)SB} ,
where
SI ∈ [0, S] and SB ∈
[
0, S (1− a)−1
]
.
The sets of feasible surplus pairs is defined as follows:
F ≡ {(SI , SB) : y = xI + xB and xI ∈ [0, y]} .
Using (1) and (4) one can show that feasibility requires that.
SI ∈ [aS − (1− a) ρ, S + (1− a) u)] and SB ∈ [−u, y − u].
Feasibility of all Pareto efficient surplus pairs requires that P ⊆ F . Consider the
borrower first. Here, feasibility requires that
[
0, S (1− a)−1
]
⊆ [−u, y − u]
Evidently, the lower bound of the first interval is an element of the second interval
since 0 ≥ −u. The upper bound of the first interval is an element of the second
interval if S (1− a)−1 ≤ y − u. Rewrite this inequality to get a ≤ ρ(y − u)−1.
Along the same line, the investor’s surplus must satisfy
[0, S] ⊆ [aS − (1− a) ρ, S + (1− a) u)]
Evidently, the upper bound of the first interval is an element of the second interval.
The lower bound of the first interval is an element of the second interval if aS −
(1− a) ρ ≤ 0. For this inequality to hold, we also need a ≤ ρ(y− u)−1. Finally, note
that ρ(y − u)−1 ≤ 1 since S ≥ 0.
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